Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of consciousness presents one of the earliest and most sophisticated articulations of what modern philosophy of mind would later describe as a Higher-Order Thought (HOT) model.
Introduction
This essay explores Sartre’s HOT-like theory of consciousness, situating it within his existential-phenomenological framework. It examines how Sartre’s notions of pre-reflective self-consciousness, reflective consciousness, and nothingness articulate an early version of the HOT model. It also discusses how his theory contrasts with and informs later developments in analytic philosophy, particularly in the works of David Rosenthal, Rocco Gennaro, and other proponents of HOT theory. Finally, the essay evaluates the implications of Sartre’s view for contemporary philosophy of mind, psychology, and existential thought.
Consciousness in Sartre’s PhenomenologySartre’s understanding of consciousness is most thoroughly developed in The Transcendence of the Ego (1936/1957) and Being and Nothingness (1943/1956). His phenomenological foundation draws heavily on Edmund Husserl but departs significantly in its rejection of an immanent ego. Sartre argues that consciousness is not an object or entity residing within itself but an intentional relation—always directed toward something other than itself (Sartre, 1956). This intentionality implies that consciousness is “nothing” in itself; it exists only as a relation to the world and to its objects.
For Sartre, consciousness possesses two key modes: pre-reflective and reflective. Pre-reflective consciousness refers to the immediate awareness that accompanies any experience. For example, when one perceives a red apple, there is not only the perception of the apple but also a tacit, non-reflective awareness that one is perceiving. This is what Sartre calls consciousness of consciousness—an immediate, non-objectifying self-awareness that is not yet reflective (Sartre, 1956). Reflective consciousness, by contrast, occurs when consciousness turns back upon itself explicitly—when one thinks I am perceiving that apple.
This two-level structure anticipates the basic schema of the HOT theory, which distinguishes between first-order mental states (those directed toward objects) and higher-order states (those directed toward other mental states) (Rosenthal, 2005). Although Sartre does not describe these levels as distinct mental events, his analysis implies that consciousness inherently includes a higher-order aspect: to be conscious of the world is already to be (implicitly) conscious of one’s consciousness.
Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness as Proto-HOT AwarenessModern HOT theorists, such as Rosenthal (1997, 2005), argue that a mental state becomes conscious only when it is accompanied by a higher-order thought about that state. For Sartre, however, this relationship is not contingent or additive; it is structural. The awareness of oneself as perceiving or thinking is built into the very act of perceiving or thinking. Sartre therefore anticipates the higher-order relation but situates it within a monadic rather than a dual-event framework.
Contemporary commentators have noted this alignment between Sartre’s phenomenology and HOT theory. Zahavi (2003) emphasizes that Sartre’s pre-reflective self-awareness “fulfills the role of higher-order representation without postulating a separate, metacognitive act” (p. 66). Similarly, Gennaro (2012) identifies Sartre as a historical precursor to the same-order variant of HOT theory, where higher-order awareness is intrinsic to the first-order state rather than externally produced.
The pre-reflective self-consciousness thus functions as an immanent higher-order structure: a consciousness that, by its very nature, knows itself as consciousness without dividing itself into separate levels. This position allows Sartre to avoid the infinite regress problem that challenges many higher-order theories—if each awareness required another higher-order act to be known, consciousness would never complete itself (Rosenthal, 2005).
Reflective Consciousness and the EgoWhile pre-reflective consciousness is the immediate awareness of experience, reflective consciousness is the act of turning consciousness upon itself as an object. In reflection, the self appears as something within experience—the “I” that thinks, feels, or perceives (Sartre, 1956). However, Sartre insists that this “I” is not the foundation of consciousness but a product of reflection. The Ego is constituted, not constitutive; it emerges as an objectified representation within the field of consciousness.
This distinction between the self as an object and the self as awareness anticipates the differentiation in HOT theory between being conscious of a mental state and conceptualizing that state as one’s own. Reflective consciousness corresponds to an explicit higher-order thought—an awareness that one is having a certain experience. In Sartre’s terms, this is the movement from non-positional to positional self-consciousness.
Importantly, Sartre rejects the Cartesian model of an inner, substantial self. There is no “thinker behind the thought.” Consciousness is self-aware precisely because it is transparent to itself, not because it contains a metaphysical ego (Catalano, 1985). This view resonates with the deflationary trend in contemporary higher-order models, which deny the necessity of a Cartesian subject to explain self-awareness (Gennaro, 2012). Sartre’s reflective consciousness thus embodies what modern theorists would call meta-representational consciousness, while his pre-reflective level constitutes implicit higher-order awareness.
Nothingness and Self-TranscendenceSartre’s ontology of nothingness deepens his account of consciousness by framing it as self-transcending. Consciousness, as for-itself (pour-soi), is defined by its capacity to negate, to stand apart from itself and the world (Sartre, 1956). This negation is the condition of self-awareness: to be conscious of something is already to differentiate oneself from it. In being conscious of one’s own consciousness, the subject introduces a gap between the experiencing self and the experienced.
This dynamic aligns with the HOT framework insofar as both posit an internal distinction within consciousness. In Sartre’s phenomenology, however, this distinction is ontological rather than cognitive—it is not a separate thought about a thought but a structural cleavage within being. The for-itself’s ability to posit itself as “nothing” makes self-awareness possible, since it can recognize itself as distinct from the world and from its own states (Moran, 2000).
In this sense, Sartre’s theory provides a phenomenological grounding for HOT models: self-consciousness arises not from a computational or representational mechanism but from the very structure of being as self-negating awareness. Consciousness transcends itself in order to apprehend itself. This insight situates Sartre’s HOT-like model within a broader existential ontology that exceeds the merely cognitive explanations of later analytic theories.
Comparison with Contemporary HOT TheoriesTo understand Sartre’s place in the genealogy of HOT theories, it is necessary to examine how his view both anticipates and diverges from modern accounts. The canonical contemporary version of HOT theory, advanced by David Rosenthal (1997, 2005), argues that a mental state is conscious only when accompanied by a higher-order thought that one is in that state. This model treats higher-order awareness as a distinct representational act, allowing for the possibility of unconscious mental states—those lacking corresponding higher-order thoughts.
Sartre, by contrast, denies the possibility of unconscious consciousness. Every conscious state, for him, is self-aware by definition. There is no such thing as an unconscious consciousness because the self-transparency of experience is intrinsic to its existence (Sartre, 1956). This difference highlights Sartre’s constitutive model versus Rosenthal’s additive model of self-awareness.
Gennaro (2012) proposes an intermediate “same-order” interpretation, in which higher-order awareness is integrated within the first-order state rather than existing separately. Sartre’s phenomenology aligns closely with this same-order approach, since pre-reflective self-consciousness does not require a second mental act. Similarly, Zahavi (2005) argues that Sartre’s account avoids the regress problem inherent in standard HOT models because it does not posit a hierarchy of mental representations. Consciousness, in Sartre’s view, is self-luminous—it reveals itself in the very act of revealing the world.
Another point of contrast concerns the epistemic status of self-awareness. In analytic HOT theory, higher-order thoughts provide a cognitive representation that makes a mental state accessible for report or reasoning (Carruthers, 2011). Sartre’s self-awareness, however, is non-conceptual and non-reflective—it is not knowledge about oneself but the lived immediacy of being oneself. This distinction underscores the phenomenological richness absent in purely cognitive accounts of consciousness.
Sartre’s Influence on the Philosophy of MindSartre’s theory of consciousness has had a profound, if sometimes indirect, influence on contemporary philosophy of mind. His early articulation of pre-reflective self-awareness anticipated key debates about the transparency and immediacy of consciousness. In the late twentieth century, phenomenologists such as Dan Zahavi and analytic philosophers like Thomas Metzinger and Gennaro have drawn upon Sartre’s insights to challenge reductive models of the mind.
Zahavi (2007) argues that Sartre provides a compelling phenomenological alternative to representational theories: self-consciousness is not a higher-order representation but a structural feature of experience. Metzinger (2003) similarly integrates Sartrean self-awareness into his theory of the “phenomenal self-model,” where the sense of self arises from the brain’s dynamic modeling of its own processes. Though Sartre rejected neuroreductionism, his insistence on consciousness as self-transcending resonates with these contemporary frameworks that treat subjectivity as an emergent, self-referential system.
In psychology and cognitive science, Sartre’s ideas have inspired work on metacognition, agency, and self-presence. The pre-reflective awareness he describes aligns with experimental evidence suggesting that humans and even non-human animals exhibit forms of non-conceptual self-awareness (Legrand, 2007). Sartre’s model also informs contemporary discussions of embodied consciousness, emphasizing that awareness is not detached introspection but an engaged mode of being-in-the-world (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012).
Existential and Ethical ImplicationsBeyond cognitive and phenomenological considerations, Sartre’s HOT-like theory carries existential significance. Because consciousness is self-aware and self-transcending, human beings are capable of reflecting on their existence and taking responsibility for it. The self’s awareness of itself as free and indeterminate underpins Sartre’s concept of bad faith—the denial of one’s own freedom by identifying with fixed roles or states (Sartre, 1956).
This existential structure presupposes a form of higher-order self-consciousness: to deceive oneself, one must implicitly know the truth one conceals. Sartre’s analysis of bad faith thus relies on the dual-level structure of consciousness—an immediate awareness and a reflective awareness of that awareness. The moral dimension of his phenomenology therefore extends the HOT model into the realm of lived existence, where self-consciousness becomes both a cognitive and an ethical condition.
Furthermore, Sartre’s insistence on self-awareness as a fundamental human condition aligns with his humanism: “Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself” (Sartre, 1946/2007, p. 22). Consciousness, as self-knowing freedom, entails responsibility. While analytic HOT theorists typically treat higher-order awareness as a cognitive mechanism, Sartre elevates it to an ontological and moral level—the basis of authenticity and existential choice.
Critiques and LimitationsDespite its depth, Sartre’s model faces several critiques when compared with contemporary HOT theories. First, his rejection of unconscious mental states has been challenged by psychoanalytic and cognitive psychological evidence suggesting that much of human cognition operates below the threshold of awareness (Freud, 1915/1957; Kihlstrom, 1987). Sartre’s insistence that all consciousness is self-aware risks conflating consciousness with cognition, ignoring subpersonal processing.
Second, Sartre’s phenomenological approach, while descriptively rich, lacks the explanatory precision favored in analytic philosophy of mind. Modern HOT theories attempt to specify the mechanisms by which higher-order thoughts arise, whereas Sartre’s framework remains existential and structural. From an empirical standpoint, this makes it less testable (Carruthers, 2011).
Third, Sartre’s identification of self-awareness with nothingness, though philosophically profound, can be criticized for its metaphysical abstraction. Contemporary theorists might argue that “nothingness” adds little explanatory value beyond metaphorical description (Gennaro, 2012). Nonetheless, these critiques highlight a productive tension between phenomenology and cognitive science rather than a contradiction.
Sartre’s Relevance to Contemporary Consciousness ResearchDespite these challenges, Sartre’s early articulation of self-awareness continues to resonate in ongoing debates about consciousness. His rejection of a substantial ego aligns with contemporary non-self and minimal self theories in phenomenology and cognitive science (Gallagher, 2000). His conception of pre-reflective self-awareness as intrinsic to all experience remains central to models of first-personal access and subjective presence (Zahavi, 2005).
Moreover, Sartre’s integration of phenomenology and existentialism offers a holistic framework for understanding consciousness as both cognitive and moral. Where analytic HOT theory tends to isolate mental functions, Sartre situates self-awareness within the broader context of human existence, freedom, and responsibility. This integrative approach provides a valuable corrective to overly reductive accounts of consciousness that neglect its lived, embodied dimension.
In recent years, interdisciplinary work combining phenomenology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence has revived interest in Sartre’s insights. Studies of self-modeling and recursive representation in artificial agents, for example, echo Sartre’s idea that self-awareness emerges through self-transcending structures (Metzinger, 2003; Frith, 2010). Thus, even in computational and empirical contexts, Sartre’s HOT-like theory continues to inspire new models of how systems—biological or artificial—can become aware of their own states.
ConclusionJean-Paul Sartre’s theory of consciousness presents one of the earliest and most sophisticated articulations of what modern philosophy of mind would later describe as a Higher-Order Thought (HOT) model. His account of pre-reflective self-consciousness, reflective awareness, and nothingness provides a phenomenological foundation for understanding how consciousness relates to itself. Unlike the additive and representational models of contemporary HOT theory, Sartre’s view conceives of self-awareness as intrinsic, immediate, and constitutive.
By situating self-consciousness within the existential structures of freedom and responsibility, Sartre extends the implications of HOT theory beyond the cognitive to the moral and ontological. His phenomenological insights continue to inform debates about the nature of subjectivity, the self, and consciousness in both philosophy and cognitive science. Ultimately, Sartre’s HOT theory of consciousness reveals that to be conscious is always already to transcend oneself—to exist as both aware of the world and aware of that awareness." (Source: ChatGPT 2025)
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