01 September 2025

Merleau Ponty and Humanistic Motivation

Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers a rich philosophical framework that can significantly deepen our understanding of humanistic motivation.

Merleau Ponty and Humanistic Motivation

Introduction

"Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is one of the central figures in twentieth-century phenomenology. His work aims to reorient philosophy (and psychology, cognition, and related fields) away from dualisms—mind vs. body, subject vs. object, perception vs. cognition—and towards an account of human experience that emphasizes embodied consciousness, prereflective action, perceptual horizons, and the intertwining of subjectivity with the world. His major works (e.g. Phenomenology of Perception) provide a rich framework for rethinking motivation, especially in the sense that motivation is not just a matter of rational deliberation or external causes, but something more basic: tied to perception, to the body, to our being-in-the-world. What I call “humanistic motivation” in this essay refers to motivation grounded in human being rather than in external reward/punishment, mechanical causality, or purely instrumental rationality—motivation that arises from values, meaning, relationality, embodiment, growth, flourishing.

In what follows: I will first outline Merleau-Ponty’s core phenomenological and philosophical concepts relevant to motivation—perception, the lived body, the intentional arc, motivation proper (as a phenomenological concept). Then I will explore how this connects to humanistic ideas (from humanistic psychology). I will examine how Merleau-Ponty can help ground or deepen humanistic motivation, compare him with thinkers in the humanistic tradition (Carl Rogers, etc.), then consider possible criticisms and limitations, and end with some implications/applications.

Key Concepts from Merleau-Ponty Relevant to Motivation

To understand Merleau-Ponty’s contribution, some of his core philosophical ideas must be sketched:

  • Primacy of Perception
Merleau-Ponty argues that perception is not secondary to thought, judgment, or rational reflection, but is first and fundamental in our experience. We “live” in a perceptual world; perception is not just input for cognition but is integral to how we engage, understand, act. He critiques both empiricism (which treats perception as raw data for thought) and intellectualism/rationalism (which privileges reason over experience). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • Corporeity / The Lived Body (Le corps propre)
For Merleau-Ponty, the body is not simply an object, or a machine controlled by mind. The “lived body” is the centre of perception and action; it is through one’s body that the world is disclosed, possibilities for action are perceived, and meaning emerges. The body is the site of perceptual intentionality. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • Intentionality and the Intentional Arc
Intentionality is a perennial concept in phenomenology (coming from Husserl)—the notion that consciousness is always “of” something. But in Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is richer: the body, habit, past experiences, cultural environment etc. all contribute to what he calls the “intentional arc” (l’arc intentionnel). The intentional arc binds one’s past, one’s body, one’s engagement, projections into the future, so that perception and action are situated in a temporally thick, embodied way. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • Motivation (Motivation as Phenomenological Grounding)

One of the key ideas in Merleau-Ponty is the concept of motivation not as external incentive alone but as a more fundamental kind of “grounding” relation. In his terms, motivation is “one phenomenon giving rise to another, not by means of efficient causality (natural cause) but through the sense (sens) it offers.” (University at Albany)


That is: when I perceive, I am already motivated in a certain way by what the perceived thing offers—its affordances, its meaningfulness, its possibilities for action. The way things appear to me (their sense) calls me toward certain kinds of behaviour or response. Motivation is embedded in perception and embodied action; it is not a purely deliberative reasoning about ends, but something more primordial. This is called “motivation proper” in some secondary literature. (JSTOR Daily)

  • Ambiguity, Horizon, and Pre-Reflective Life

Relatedly, perception (and thus motivation) does not come in clear, fully explicit ways; there is always horizon, ambiguity, background, tacit knowledge, tacit capacities. Pre-reflective life (our everyday, before we explicitly think about our experience) plays a big role. Our habitual body, our skillful coping with the world, our embodied know-how, all contribute to how things motivate us. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • Relationality and Situatedness

Merleau-Ponty strongly emphasizes that we are always situated in a world—historically, socially, bodily—and that this matters for how we perceive, what we find meaningful, what motivates. The world is not neutral or inert but saturated with meaning, intersubjectivity, culture, others. Our motivations and possibilities are shaped by that. Also, we perceive other people as embodied others, with whom we share a common world, not via detached reasoning but via bodily interrelation. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • Freedom, Ambiguity, and Openness

For Merleau-Ponty, human existence is marked by a tension: on one side, the body, habits, environment, culture restrict; on the other, the possibility of novelty, of new projects, of different engagements. Freedom is not absolute, but is rooted in our corporeal being and in the fact that perception already opens up possibilities. The human being is not wholly determined; there is openness. This is crucial if one wants to speak of humanistic motivation (which involves growth, self-transcendence, etc.). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

These elements give us a philosophical foundation for thinking about motivation in a richer way than many standard models (e.g. behaviorism, mechanistic psychology, simplistic cognitive models).

What is “Humanistic Motivation”?

Before seeing how Merleau-Ponty’s ideas bear on humanistic motivation, one needs a working understanding of what is meant by humanistic motivation. Although humanistic psychology doesn’t have a single uniform theory, some typical features include:
  • Motives grounded in self-actualization: growth, becoming more fully oneself, realizing potentials (think Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers).
  • Emphasis on authenticity, meaning, values rather than just rewards or external incentives.
  • Recognition of the whole person—body, emotions, relationships, creativity—not reducing to cognitive or behavioral elements.
  • The idea that people are not just driven by deficiency needs or external pressures, but by positive aspirations, relations, self-transcendence.
  • Importance of intersubjectivity, empathy, human relations: we are shaped by others and shape them; meaning is often co-constituted.

  • The lived experience is central; subjective experience is fundamental and valid.

Humanistic motivation then refers to the kind of motivation that issues from these features—the desire to grow, to find meaning, to engage authentically, to express one’s being in relation to others. In contrast to extrinsic motivation, instrumental goals, or purely rational/instrumental choice, humanistic motivation is more holistic, embodied, values-oriented.

How Merleau-Ponty Helps to Ground Humanistic Motivation

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology gives philosophical resources for rooting humanistic motivation in one’s embodied, perceptual, relational being rather than in detached or external frameworks. Let me highlight how his ideas supply or enrich three aspects of humanistic motivation: origins (where motivation “comes from”), structure, and challenges.

Origins: Where Humanistic Motivation Comes From - Merleau-Ponty
  • Perceptual Affordances and Motives

Merleau-Ponty suggests that the world we perceive presents affordances—possibilities for action. These are not neutral. The way things appear to us invite us to engage, to act. For example, when I see a path, I see it as a way toward something, maybe toward a destination, toward exploration. That invitation is part of perception itself.

  • Thus humanistic motivations—such as creativity, connection with nature, art, caring for others—are seeded in perceptual experience: landscapes, encounters, sensorial, relational features of the world that call out to us.

  • Embodied Habits and Situated Past
Our past experiences, our embodied habit, our culture, our emotional background shape which motives are available, which values appear as meaningful. The intentional arc includes our biography, learned ways of being in the world, bodily capacities. For humanistic motivation, this means our deep sense of self, our authenticity, our striving, inherits structure from those preceding embodied formations. But also there is room for novelty (new habits, new expressions).
  • Affective Pull / Sentiment / Sense of Meaning
Because perception already includes more than just raw sensory data—it includes meaning, emotional valence, affectivity—motivation arises in part from affect. We feel drawn; we are solicited by possibilities. That affective dimension is pre-deliberative. It is not that first we reason “this is good, I should pursue it”, but the world appears to us in certain ways which include an attraction, a pull, a value. That helps ground positive motivations (humanistic ones).
  • Interpersonal and Intersubjective Origins
Our relations with others—and their perceivable being, gestures, presence—motivate. We are moved by empathy, intersubjective recognition; we are relational beings. Humanistic motivation often includes concern for others, empathy; Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy sees other persons not as abstract agents but as embodied others we perceive, engage with, share world with. Thus humanistic motives such as caring, authenticity in relationship, community derive their force from our relational being.

  • Freedom, Openness, and the Tension of Ambiguity
 Because our embodied intentionality is not completely determined, because the perceptual world offers multiple possible ways of being, there is space for choice, for new projects, for self-transformation. Humanistic motivation draws on that space: the possibility of becoming, of transcending constraints, of creativity.

Structure: How Humanistic Motivation Works According to Merleau-Ponty

What shape does humanistic motivation take, once grounded in the embodied perception etc.?

  • Pre-reflective Motivation

Much of motivation is pre-reflective: the way things call me occurs before I fully think about them. The perceivable world, my body’s dispositions, habits, my affective resonance with things, all contribute to motivating action even before I deliberate. Humanistic motivation often wants authenticity, meaning, but that cannot be fully mediated through rational reflection; authenticity shows up in how one lives, perceives, acts, often pre-reflectively.
  • Horizonal Structure / Partiality
Motives show up in a horizon: we see some possibilities, others are occluded. They come with partial clarity, ambiguity. So humanistic motivation is not always fully explicit, not always fully conscious. E.g. someone may act with the motive of “being authentic” without fully being able to articulate what that means. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology helps us appreciate those subtle, tacit aspects.
  • Motivation as Sense / Meaning, Not Just Cause
The causal model of motivation (stimulus → response, desire → action, or rational judgment → act) is too thin. Merleau-Ponty insists that what motivates is sense: the meaning the perceived object has, its affordances, its value. Humanistic motivations align well with this: what matters is not only what produces behaviour, but what meaning drives, what value, what vision. For example the motive to help others is saturated with meaning, not just external reward or obligation.
  • Temporal/Intentional Arc
Motivation is temporally structured: past, present, future, body, culture all interweave. For humanistic motivation, growth or self-actualization is not instantaneous; it is built over time, through embodied practice, habit, reflection, choice. The arc of one’s life, one’s history, shapes one’s current motivational horizon, and one projects oneself toward future possibilities.

  • Interplay Between Agency and Limit

Humanistic motivation is meaningful only in relation to both possibility and constraint. Constraints come from the body, situation, culture; agency comes from the openness, the possibilities afforded. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy acknowledges both. Motivation is thus not about asserting free will in abstraction, but navigating one’s situation, acting in and through one’s embodied world, transforming habits, recognizing limitations, etc.

Merleau-Ponty & Humanistic Psychology: Points of Convergence

Given the above, there are significant convergences between Merleau-Ponty’s thought and humanistic psychology (e.g. Rogers, Maslow, etc.).

  • In From person-centered to humanistic-phenomenological psychotherapy, Virginia Moreira argues that Merleau-Ponty’s definition of humanism (focusing on the human being in relationship with other human beings, and the mutual constitution of a common history) provides theoretical depth to humanistic psychotherapy. (Taylor & Francis Online)
  • Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on lived experience, the body, perceptual meaning aligns with Rogers’s interest in the subjective experience, authenticity, the self in growth. Psychotherapies that take experience seriously (client-centered, experiential) fit well with phenomenological insight: therapy is not just about correcting behavior or thinking, but about reconnecting, in a lived way, to one’s perceptions, feelings, bodily being, relational being in the world. (SAGE Journals)
  • The notion of “motivation” in Merleau-Ponty as sense/giving rise by meaning, rather than external cause, parallels humanistic emphases that intrinsic motivation (doing something because it is inherently meaningful, self-expressive) is central for well-being.
  • Also, humanistic psychologists often emphasize authenticity, creativity, self-transcendence; Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy gives philosophical grounding to these: authenticity is tied to perceiving and living in accordance with one’s embodied possibilities; self-transcendence may mean exceeding prior habitual constraints, opening to new perceptual, relational possibilities.
Challenges and Differences

While there is much fertile ground, there are also differences and challenges when trying to align Merleau-Ponty with humanistic motivation; some potential difficulties, critical considerations, or tensions include:

  • Merleau-Ponty is not a “therapy manual”
His work is philosophical, phenomenological, descriptive more than prescriptive. He doesn’t always give clear methods for how one rediscover or actualize humanistic motivations. In contrast, humanistic psychology tends to lean toward practice, intervention, self-help, therapy.
  • Ambiguity vs. Clarity
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes ambiguity, horizon, tacitness. While this is philosophically rich, for humanistic motivation it can lead to lack of clarity: what exactly does being authentic mean for a particular person, what values, etc. There is always the risk of relativism or vagueness.
  • Motivation can be constrained by structure, habit, power
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that our possibilities are always limited by habit, bodily capacities, context, culture. Humanistic psychologists also recognize constraints, but often emphasize potential and growth perhaps more optimistically. For some, Merleau-Ponty’s picture might seem to underplay just how difficult transformation is (which is okay, but those difficulties matter in motivation: sometimes constraints are oppressive, habitual patterns very entrenched).
  • Normativity: Whose values? Whose meaning?
If motivation arises from meaning, sense, perceptual/habituated values, one must ask how those values are formed, whether they are critical, reflective, whether some are oppressive. Merleau-Ponty doesn’t always give a full account of how critical normativity arises (though he does engage with politics, history, ethics etc.). But humanistic motivation sometimes needs normative guidance: what counts as flourishing, authenticity, etc. How to distinguish healthier vs. pathological motives?
  • Potential tension between individual authenticity and social/intersubjective embeddedness
Humanistic psychology sometimes pictures authenticity as the self finding itself, perhaps in contrast to social demands. Merleau-Ponty’s thought emphasizes that one is always socially, historically, bodily embedded; authenticity is not escaping from all sociality, but engaging with it; sometimes social constraints shape who one is. So there may be tension or misconception if humanistic motivation is taken individualistically; Merleau-Ponty helps correct that but also highlights that some motives may come from oppressive contexts.
  • Practical Transformation
While Merleau-Ponty illuminates how perception, embodiment, meaning, habit, etc. can motivate, the question remains of how people change their habits, how to open perception to new sense, how to cultivate new motives when old habits or oppressive structures dominate. Merleau-Ponty gives resources, but often more in analysis than in method.
Implications and Applications

Given how Merleau-Ponty helps ground a rich conception of humanistic motivation, what are the implications—both theoretical and practical—for psychology, philosophy, ethics, education, therapy, etc.?

  • Therapeutic Practice
A humanistic-phenomenological psychotherapy, as Moreira (2012) describes, can use Merleau-Ponty’s insights to help clients re-engage with their lived body, perceptual world, become aware of tacit motives, and open up to new possibilities. Therapy would attend not just to narratives, beliefs, but to embodied experience, perception, affect, relational being. (Taylor & Francis Online)

For example, helping someone to “feel themselves” in their body, to perceive what the world offers them, to notice what possibilities they are closing off, what relations they avoid, etc., could help awaken humanistic motivations (growth, meaning, authenticity). 
  • Education
In educational settings, emphasizing embodied learning, perception, and lived experience can motivate students more deeply than merely giving them external rewards, assessments, or abstract knowledge. Encouraging projects, creative engagement, relating learning to lived world and personal meaning helps align with Merleau-Ponty’s view.


Also, helping students develop their “intentional arc” by cultivating habits, reflecting on past experience, projecting toward future, etc.
  • Ethics and Political Philosophy
    Merleau-Ponty’s thought shows that ethical motivation cannot be purely abstract, but arises from perception, situational awareness, relation to others. Thus ethics needs to account for embodiment, for relationality, for historical and situational embeddedness.

    In social/political movements, humanistic motivation (justice, solidarity, mutual recognition) can draw from perceptual awareness of others’ suffering, from relational embodiments, rather than only ideological argument.
  • Self-Development / Spirituality
    For individuals seeking to live more authentically or grow, recognizing that motives are perceptually grounded can help. Practices like mindfulness, meditation, arts, nature, bodily practices (dance, walking, crafts) can open new perceptual horizons; these then invite new motives.

    Also, reflecting on one’s habits, acknowledging how one is shaped by past, culture, and exploring new embodied ways of being (habit change) is important.
  • Research in Psychology, Cognition, Embodied Cognition
Merleau-Ponty is often cited in embodied cognition research. His idea of the body and perception as constitutive of cognition suggests that motivation studies should attend more to how perception, affordances, bodily states, and environment shape what motivates us, rather than only internal mental states or external stimuli.

Empirical work on intrinsic motivation, flow (Csikszentmihalyi), values, emotion can be enriched by phenomenology: asking what it is like to be motivated, what features of perceptual situations support intrinsic motivation. 

Case Examples

To illustrate concretely how Merleau-Ponty’s framework could be used to analyze humanistic motivation, here are a few hypothetical or drawn-from life examples:

  • Artist and Paintings
 An artist walking through a forest is struck by the light on leaves, the sounds, the textures. This perceptual experience invites painting; the world offers something—color, shape, mood—that “calls” the artist. The motive here is not merely external praise or reward, but an intrinsic attraction: the sense of color, of form, of mood. The artist is moved to paint because of how the world appears. Over time, habit (technique, style) shapes what they are capable of, what they attend to; yet there is still room for novelty, exploration.
  • Teacher in a Classroom
 A teacher senses that some students are disengaged; the silence, body language, lack of interaction. The teacher, as embodied being in that situation, feels a kind of unease, a pull to do something different (change pace, engage differently). That unease is perceptual, affective, relational. Motivated not by evaluation or external metrics, but by concern, meaning, relationality. Over time the teacher’s past experiences, habits, beliefs shape how that pull is conceptualized and what actions are possible.
  • Recovery from Trauma or Addiction
Someone recovering from trauma may have habitual ways of avoiding feeling, perceiving, relating. Humanistic motivation here might come when something in the world (a trusted relationship, art, nature) breaks through the avoidance: a moment of felt connection or aesthetic perception, or relational trust, that offers a sense of possibility beyond avoidance. That Moment of meaning becomes a motive to pursue therapy, to heal, self-care. The embodied sense of possibility supports the motivation more strongly than abstract reasoning or external pressure.
  • Community / Social Action
Observing injustice (say poverty, discrimination) in one’s community, one is affected bodily and relationally (empathy, anger, sorrow). That affective‐perceptual experience motivates action. The motive is not just political ideology or reward but relational, ethical sense: what is happening to others is perceived; one is part of intersubjective world; justice, dignity, relational wholeness become motives

Critiques, Limitations, and Open Questions

While Merleau-Ponty offers rich resources, there are open questions and limitations when one tries to adopt his insights for humanistic motivation.

  • Vagueness and Implementation
As mentioned, describing how perception motivates is often more descriptive than prescriptive. How does one cultivate perceptual sensitivity, change habitual perception, develop motives toward flourishing? There is less guidance on method.
  • Risk of Overemphasis on Perception at Expense of Reflection or Cognitive Deliberation
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the perceptual, embodied, pre-reflective side. Sometimes one might need more explicit norms, critical reflection, rational deliberation to choose between motives, assess value, resist oppressive habitual motives. Humanistic motivation cannot ignore the role of critical reasoning, ethical reflection.
  • Cultural & Social Constraints
Habits, environment, material constraints, social power, ideology deeply shape perceptual world and what is meaningful. Some motives may be systematically suppressed, distorted, or co-opted. For people in disadvantaged positions, perceptual affordances may be limited; humanistic motivation may risk being aspirational without acknowledging structural injustice. Merleau-Ponty is sensitive to context, but the framework might underplay how power, social structures limit what is perceptible and what is possible.
  • Ethical Normativity
Which motives are “good”, which harmful? Merleau-Ponty gives no simple criteria. Humanistic motivation often assumes that growth, authenticity, self-actualization are good, but those may be ambiguous in practice, and what counts as “self” is contested. For example, “authenticity” as self-expression may in some contexts align with privilege more than with socially marginalized identities.
  • Motivation vs. Sustained Action
Being moved or motivated in a moment is one thing; sustaining motive, translating it into long-term commitments and behaviour is another. Habit, fatigue, competing demands may override. How does Merleau-Ponty’s account help us understand persistence, resilience in motivation?

Possible Further Development (Bridging Merleau-Ponty with Humanistic Motivation)

Given the above strengths and challenges, here are suggestions for how one might develop a more systematic account of humanistic motivation, taking Merleau-Ponty seriously, and filling in gaps:

  • Phenomenological Practice / Training
Develop practices to heighten perceptual sensitivity: mindfulness, arts, nature, bodily movement, etc., as ways of making perception more open to affordances, meaning, novelty. Such practices help bring the tacit horizon to awareness.
  • Narrative and Reflective Integration
While pre-reflective motivation is primordial, reflection and narrative help shape motive, clarify value, integrate past and projected future. Humanistic motivation benefits from helping people narrate their lives, articulate what matters, evaluate which motives to embrace.
  • Embodied Ethical Education
Teach ethics not only as principles but as perceptual sensitivity, relational awareness, habits of care. E.g. empathy training, relational attunement, recognizing the presence of others. This ground ethics in lived perceptual experience rather than abstract rule.
  • Institutional and Social Structures
For humanistic motivation to flourish, social/institutional structures need to support perceptual openness, relationality, authentic engagement. For example in workplaces, education, community life: spaces for creativity, reflective time, relationality, bodily presence.
  • Empirical Research Informed by Phenomenology
Use qualitative, phenomenological methods to investigate how people experience meaning, how perception motivates, how bodily, affective, relational dimensions play out in motivation. Combine with quantitative work to understand how conditions (environment, culture, etc.) support or hinder humanistic motives.
  • Moral and Political Reflection
Given that perception is shaped by culture, power, history, humanistic motivation requires critical consciousness: seeing how some perceptions are conditioned, distorted, suppressed (e.g. in ideologies, media, power relations). Thus motivation should include critical awareness; humanistic motivational projects often have a political dimension (seeking justice, inclusion, recognition).
 
Summary & Conclusion

Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers a rich philosophical framework that can significantly deepen our understanding of humanistic motivation. In his account:

  • Motivation is not something external or purely intellectual, but is embedded in perception, the lived body, habit, relationality, affect.
  • The sense or meaning things present to us—and the perceptual affordances of the world—are primary in calling us toward action.
  • Humanistic motivations—growth, authenticity, meaningful relations—can be rooted in how we perceive, feel, desire, relate—with the body and world, not detached from them.
  • At the same time, humanistic motivation requires awareness of one’s embodied, historical, social situation; of constraints; and involves both pre-reflective and reflective dimensions.

In integrating Merleau-Ponty with humanistic psychology and practice, there is promise: more grounded, embodied, relational, meaning-rich motivation; less reliance on external incentives or abstract rationalism; deeper appreciation for possibility, for nuance, for human being as flesh in world.

There are challenges: translating philosophical clarity into practice, ensuring normative clarity, resisting oppression in perceptual worlds, sustaining motivation over time.

In conclusion, Merleau-Ponty does not just provide a supportive backdrop for humanistic motivation; he can help transform our understanding of what motivation itself is—showing that motivation is anchored in our embodied being, our perception of meaning, in the relational world, in affective pull, in possibility—even before we think about reasons. For anyone interested in building a more humane psychology, ethics, education, therapy, Merleau-Ponty offers indispensable foundations." (Source: ChatGPT 20225)

References

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(Original work published 1945)

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